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Abstract
We develop a novel computerized real e®ort task, based on moving sliders across a screen,
to test experimentally whether agents are disappointment averse when they compete in a
real e®ort sequential-move tournament. We predict that a disappointment averse agent, who
is loss averse around her endogenous choice-acclimating expectations-based reference point,
responds negatively to her rival's e®ort. We ¯nd signi¯cant evidence for this discouragement
e®ect, and use the Method of Simulated Moments to estimate the strength of disappointment
aversion on average and the heterogeneity in disappointment aversion across the population.
Keywords: Disappointment aversion; Loss aversion; Reference-dependent preferences; Ref-
erence point adjustment; Expectations; Tournament; Real e®ort experiment; Slider task.
JEL Classi¯cation: C91; D03.
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Disappointment at doing worse than expected can be a powerful emotion. This emotion may
be particularly intense when the disappointed agent exerted e®ort in competing for a prize,
thus raising her expectation of winning. Furthermore, a rational agent who anticipates possible
disappointment will optimize taking into account the expected disappointment arising from her
choice.
In this paper we use a laboratory experiment to test whether agents are disappointment
averse when they compete in a real e®ort tournament. In particular, we test whether our
subjects are loss averse around reference points given by endogenous expectations which adjust
to both an agent's own e®ort choice and that of her rival. Pairs of subjects complete a novel
computerized real e®ort task, called the \slider task", which involves moving sliders across a
screen. The First Mover completes the task, followed by the Second Mover, who observes the
First Mover's e®ort before choosing how hard to work.1 A money prize is awarded to one of the
pair members based on the pair's relative work e®orts and some element of chance which we
control. After each repetition, the subjects are re-paired. We impose probabilities of winning the
prize which are linear in the di®erence in the agents' e®orts, so the marginal impact of a Second
Mover's e®ort on her probability of winning does not depend on the e®ort of the First Mover she
is paired with. Therefore, if agents care only about money and their cost of e®ort, the Second
Mover's work e®ort should not depend on the e®ort of the First Mover. However, as predicted
by our model of disappointment aversion, the experimental data show a discouragement e®ect:
the Second Mover shies away from working hard when she observes that the First Mover has
worked hard, and tends to work relatively hard when she observes that her competitor has put
in low e®ort. Thus First and Second Movers' e®orts are strategic substitutes.
Our primary contribution is empirical. First, we o®er evidence consistent with disappoint-
ment aversion from a reduced form linear random e®ects panel regression. More substantively,
we exploit the richness of our experimental data set to estimate the parameters of a structural
model of disappointment aversion using the Method of Simulated Moments. This allows us
to estimate the strength of disappointment aversion on average and the extent of heterogene-
ity in disappointment aversion across the population. Goodness of ¯t analysis shows that the
estimated model ¯ts our data well.
Together with random variation in the monetary prize across pairs of subjects, the design of
our slider task generates su±cient variation in behavior to enable us to estimate the structural
parameters of our model of disappointment aversion. In particular, the slider task gives a ¯nely
gradated measure of performance over a short time scale. As the task takes only two minutes
to complete, we can collect repeated observations of the same Second Movers facing di®erent
prizes and First Mover e®orts, while the ¯neness of the performance measure allows us to observe
accurately how Second Movers respond to di®erent prizes and First Mover e®orts. The resulting
panel data permit precise quanti¯cation of the distribution of the cost of e®ort and the strength
of disappointment aversion across agents in the population.
The formal model that we test is a natural extension of disappointment aversion to situations
1We use a sequential tournament to give clean identi¯cation, rather than because most competitive situations
involve sequential e®ort choices.
1in which agents compete. Models of disappointment aversion (e.g., Bell, 1985; Loomes and
Sugden, 1986; Delqui¶ e and Cillo, 2006; K} oszegi and Rabin, 2006, 2007) build on the idea that
agents are sensitive to deviations from what they expected to receive; in particular, agents
are loss averse around their expected payo® so losses relative to this expectation are more
painful than equal-sized gains are pleasurable. We model expectations-based reference points
as adjusting to an agent's own e®ort choice and that of her rival: in the terminology of K} oszegi
and Rabin (2007) they are choice-acclimating. The endogeneity of an agent's reference point is
crucial: with loss aversion around a ¯xed reference point, even if given by a prior expectation,
a Second Mover will continue to disregard First Mover e®ort.
Our empirical results thus address two important open questions in the literature on reference-
dependent preferences: (i) what constitutes agents' reference points?; and (ii) how quickly do
these reference points adjust to new circumstances? Our analysis provides evidence that when
agents compete they have reference points given by their expected monetary payo® and that an
agent's reference point adjusts essentially instantaneously to her own e®ort choice and that of
her competitor.
Abeler et al. (2009) also provide reduced form evidence consistent with choice-acclimating
reference-dependent preferences in the context of e®ort provision. Abeler et al. run a laboratory
experiment in which subjects have a 50% chance of being paid piece-rate and a 50% chance of
receiving a ¯xed payment, and show that e®ort increases in the ¯xed payment. To the best of
our knowledge, however, we are the ¯rst to estimate the strength of loss aversion around choice-
acclimating reference points when agents exert e®ort. Furthermore, we are able to leverage our
structural analysis to provide evidence that the expectation which acts as the reference point
adjusts to the agent's own choice of e®ort. In contrast, Abeler et al. (2009) do not distinguish
between their choice-acclimating model and a more parsimonious model in which the reference
point adjusts to the ¯xed payment but not the agent's actual e®ort choice. Finally, we provide
evidence that choice-acclimating reference points are important in a di®erent context to Abeler
et al., namely one in which agents work to in°uence their probability of success. Such situations
are common: in labor markets, workers often exert e®ort to increase their chances of winning
promotions and bonuses; while agents also work to make success more likely in sports contests,
examinations, patent races and elections.
Complementary to our laboratory ¯ndings, Doran (2009), Pope and Schweitzer (2009) and
Crawford and Meng (2010) ¯nd evidence of expectations-based reference-dependent preferences
when cab drivers and professional golfers exert e®ort in the ¯eld.2 In particular, Crawford
and Meng (2010) estimate the average strength of loss aversion for cab drivers around rational
expectations-based daily income and hours targets. In contrast to our model, in these papers the
reference point is taken to be ¯xed when the agents choose how hard to work, and so is not choice-
acclimating. Evidence of expectations-based reference points in the absence of e®ort provision
includes Loomes and Sugden (1987) and Choi et al. (2007), who study choices over lotteries, Post
et al. (2008), who ¯nd evidence that reference points adjust during the course of the game show
\Deal or No Deal", Card and Dahl (2010), who show that the probability of domestic violence
2An earlier literature in which reference points do not adjust to expectations explicitly also ¯nds evidence of
reference-dependent preferences in the ¯eld; for example, Camerer et al. (1997) study cab drivers and Fehr and
GÄ otte (2007) analyze bike messengers.
2when an NFL football team loses depends on the extent to which the loss was expected, and
Ericson and Fuster (2010), who ¯nd that the valuation placed on an endowed good depends on
the probability that a trading opportunity will arise. The psychology literature also supports the
thesis that agents' emotional responses to the outcomes of gambles include disappointment and
elation, that agents anticipate these emotions when choosing between gambles and that exerting
e®ort, by increasing the likelihood of a good outcome, intensi¯es disappointment (Mellers et al.,
1999; van Dijk et al., 1999).
Finally, our ¯nding of a Second Mover discouragement e®ect adds to the existing literature
on laboratory tournaments by showing that non-standard preferences can move behavior away
from that predicted by standard theory and by providing evidence of the impact of feedback
during tournaments. Charness and Kuhn (2010) summarize the experimental literature: Bull
et al. (1987) study tournaments with an induced cost of e®ort; van Dijk et al. (2001) introduce
real e®ort; while Berger and Pope (2009) and Eriksson et al. (2009) consider feedback.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the slider task and the
design of the experiment. Section 3 develops our model of disappointment aversion when agents
compete. Section 4 presents the empirical analysis. Section 5 discusses alternative behavioral
explanations of the discouragement e®ect. Section 6 concludes. Appendix A derives proofs not
included in the main text. Appendix B provides further details about the structural estimation
method and the model's goodness of ¯t. Finally, Appendices C and D [intended for online
publication] lay out the instructions provided to the experimental subjects.
2 Experimental Design
We ran 6 experimental sessions at the Nu±eld Centre for Experimental Social Sciences (CESS)
in Oxford, all conducted on weekdays at the same time of day in late February and early
March 2009 and lasting approximately 90 minutes.3 20 student subjects (who did not report
Psychology or Economics as their main subject of study) participated in each session, with 120
participants in total. The subjects were drawn from the CESS subject pool which is managed
using the Online Recruitment System for Economic Experiments (ORSEE). The experimental
instructions (Appendix C) were provided to each subject in written form and were read aloud
to the subjects. Seating positions were randomized. To ensure subject-experimenter anonymity,
actions and payments were linked to randomly allocated Participant ID numbers. Each subject
was paid a show-up fee of $4 and earned an average of a further $10 during the experiment
(all payments were in Pounds sterling). Subjects were paid privately in cash by the laboratory
administrator. The experiment was programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
2.1 The Slider Task
Before setting out the experimental procedure, we ¯rst describe the novel computerized real
e®ort task, which we call the \slider task", that we designed for the purpose of this experiment.
The slider task consists of a single screen displaying a number of sliders. The number
and position of the sliders on the screen does not vary across experimental subjects or across
3We also ran one pilot session without any monetary incentives whose results are not reported here.
3repetitions of the task. A schematic representation of a single slider is shown in Figure 1.
When the screen containing the e®ort task is ¯rst displayed to the subject all of the sliders are
positioned at 0, as shown for a single slider in Figure 1(a). By using the mouse, the subject
can position each slider at any integer location between 0 and 100 inclusive. Each slider can be
adjusted and readjusted an unlimited number of times and the current position of each slider
is displayed to the right of the slider. The subject's \points score" in the task is the number of
sliders positioned at 50 at the end of the allotted time. Figure 1(b) shows a correctly positioned
slider. As the task proceeds, the screen displays the subject's current points score and the
amount of time remaining.
(a) Initial position. (b) Positioned at 50.
Figure 1: Schematic representation of a slider.
The number of sliders and task length can be chosen by the experimenter. In this experiment
we used 48 sliders and an allotted time of 120 seconds. The sliders were displayed on 22 inch
widescreen monitors with a 1680 by 1050 pixel resolution. To move the sliders, the subjects
used 800 dpi USB mice with the scroll wheel disabled.4 Figure 2 shows a screen of sliders as
shown to the subject in the laboratory. In this example, the subject has positioned three of the
sliders at 50 and a points score of 3 is shown at the top of the screen. A fourth slider is currently
positioned at 33 and this slider does not contribute to the subject's points score as it is not
positioned correctly. To ensure that all the sliders are equally di±cult to position correctly, the
48 sliders are arranged on the screen such that no two sliders are aligned exactly one under the
other. This prevents the subject being able to position the higher slider at 50 and then easily
position the lower slider by copying the position of the higher slider.
The slider task gives a ¯nely gradated measure of performance and involves little randomness;
thus we interpret a subject's point score as e®ort exerted in the task. In Section 4 we see that
with 48 sliders and an allotted time of 120 seconds, measured e®ort varies from 0 to 41, so
the task gives rise to substantial variation in behavior, and hence we can observe accurately
how Second Movers respond to di®erent prizes and First Mover e®orts. As the task takes
only two minutes to complete, we can collect repeated observations of the same Second Movers
facing di®erent prizes and First Mover e®orts, allowing us to control for persistent unobserved
heterogeneity. The resulting panel data enable us to use structural estimation to quantify
precisely the distribution of the cost of e®ort and the strength of disappointment aversion across
agents in the population.
The slider task also has a number of other desirable attributes: it is simple to communicate
and to understand; it does not require or test pre-existing knowledge; it is identical across
repetitions; there is no scope for guessing; and as the task is computerized, it is easy to implement
and allows °exible real-time subject interactions.
4The keyboards were also disabled to prevent the subjects using the arrow keys to position the sliders.
4Notes: The screen presented here is slightly squarer than the one seen by our subjects.
Figure 2: Screen showing 48 sliders.
2.2 Experimental Procedure
In every session 10 subjects were told that they would be a \First Mover" and the other 10 that
they would be a \Second Mover" for the duration of the session. Each session consisted of 2
practice rounds followed by 10 paying rounds.
In every paying round, each First Mover was paired anonymously with a Second Mover.
Each pair's prize was chosen randomly from f$0:10;$0:20;:::;$3:90g and revealed to the pair
members. The First and Second Movers then completed our slider task sequentially, with the
Second Mover discovering the points score of the First Mover she was paired with before starting
the task. As explained in Section 2.1, we used a slider task with 48 sliders and an allotted time
of 120 seconds. During the task, a number of pieces of information appeared at the top of the
subject's screen: the round number; the time remaining; whether the subject was a First or
Second Mover; the prize for the round; and the subject's points score in the task so far. If the
subject was a Second Mover, she also saw the points score of the First Mover. Figure 2 provides
an example of the screen visible to the Second Movers.
The probability of winning the prize for each pair member was 50 plus her own points score
minus the other pair member's points score, all divided by 100. Thus, we imposed winning
probabilities linear in the di®erence of the points scores, with equal points scores giving equal
winning probabilities, while an increase of 1 in the di®erence raised the chance of winning by 1
5percentage point for the pair member with the higher points score. The probability of winning
function was explained verbally and using Table 6 (see Appendix C). At the end of the round,
the subjects saw a summary screen showing their own points score, the other pair member's
points score, their probability of winning the prize given the respective points scores, the prize
for the round and whether they were the winner or loser of the prize in that round.
After each paying round the subjects were re-paired according to Cooper et al. (1996)'s
\no contagion" matching algorithm. This rotation-based algorithm ensures that not only do the
same subjects never meet each other more than once, but that each round is truly one-shot in the
sense that a given subject's actions in one round cannot in°uence, either directly or indirectly,
the actions of other subjects that the subject is paired with later on. The explanation to the
subjects in the experimental instructions provides further detail.
Before starting the paying rounds, the subjects played 2 practice rounds to gain familiarity
with the task and procedure and to give opportunities for questions. To prevent contamination
the subjects were made aware that during the practice rounds they were playing against au-
tomata who behaved randomly. At the end of each practice round, the subjects were informed
of what their probability of winning would have been given the respective points scores, but
were not told that they had won or lost in that round, and no prizes were awarded. We do not
include the practice rounds in the econometric analysis.
3 Theoretical Predictions
In this Section we provide a theoretical model of the behavior of a generic pair of First and
Second Movers competing for a prize v in a particular round. After describing the model, we
show that in the absence of disappointment aversion the Second Mover's e®ort does not depend
on the First Mover's e®ort, while a disappointment averse Second Mover will respond negatively
to the e®ort choice of the First Mover.
3.1 One-Shot Theory Model
Two agents compete to win a ¯xed prize of monetary value v > 0 in a rank-order tournament,
choosing their e®ort levels sequentially. The First Mover chooses her e®ort level e1 from an
action space A µ [0;e] which can be discrete or continuous. The Second Mover observes e1
before choosing her e®ort level e2 from A. As noted in Section 2.1, we interpret a subject's
points score in the slider task as e®ort exerted.5 Agent i's probability of winning the prize
Pi(ei;ej) increases linearly in the di®erence between her own e®ort, ei, and the other agent's
e®ort, ej. Assuming symmetry of the probability of winning functions,
Pi(ei;ej) =
ei ¡ ej + °
2°
; (1)
5Our use of the term e®ort therefore corresponds to the behavior of the agent (the number of correctly
positioned sliders) rather than the associated cost of positioning the sliders.
6where we impose ° ¸ e to ensure that Pi 2 [0;1].6 Throughout we focus on the behavior of the
Second Mover conditional on the First Mover's e®ort e1. Thus we are able to abstract from any
game-theoretic considerations, as the Second Mover faces a pure optimization problem given the
First Mover e®ort that she observes.
3.2 No Disappointment Aversion
Applying the canonical model in the tournament literature, the Second Mover's utility U2 is
separable into utility u2(y2) from her tournament payo® y2 2 f0;vg, which we call her material
utility, and her cost of e®ort C2(e2), so
U2(y2;e2) = u2(y2) ¡ C2(e2): (2)
This separability assumption in the canonical model is equivalent to saying that: (i) the cost of
e®ort does not depend on whether the agent wins the prize; and (ii) when the monetary prize is
awarded, the valuation placed on the prize is independent of how hard the agent worked. The
agent exerts e®ort in a two minute interval before the outcome of the tournament is determined,
justifying the ¯rst assumption. In relation to (ii), disappointment aversion is a micro-founded
explanation of why agents might indeed care about e®orts exerted when evaluating the prize
(our model of disappointment predicts that the Second Mover's value to winning relative to
losing is increasing in her own e®ort).7
Separability implies that the Second Mover's expected utility is given by
EU2(e2;e1) = P2(e2;e1)u2(v) + (1 ¡ P2(e2;e1))u2(0) ¡ C2(e2)
= (u2(v) ¡ u2(0))
µ
e2 ¡ e1 + °
2°
¶
+ u2(0) ¡ C2(e2): (3)
As the winning probabilities are linear in the di®erence in e®orts, the First Mover's e®ort e1 has
no e®ect on the marginal impact of the Second Mover's e®ort e2 on her probability of winning.
Thus the Second Mover's marginal utility with respect to her own e®ort does not depend on e1,
giving the following result.
Proposition 1 In the canonical model without disappointment aversion the Second Mover's
optimal e®ort e¤
2 (or set of optimal e®orts) does not depend on the First Mover's e®ort e1.
Note that we have not imposed any concavity, continuity or di®erentiability assumptions on
u2(y2) (and nor have we assumed anything about the shape of C2(e2)). Thus the result continues
to hold if the Second Mover exhibits any degree of risk aversion over her monetary payo®, if she
places a value on winning per se in addition to the value placed on the monetary payo® from
6Che and Gale (2000) call this a piece-wise linear di®erence-form success function. Note that for any First
Mover e®ort e1 2 A, the Second Mover's probability of winning function is given by P2 =
e2¡e1+°
2° for the whole
range of e2 2 A as e1 ¸ 0 and e2 · e · ° so e2 · ° + e1 and hence
e2¡e1+°
2° · 1, while e1 · e · ° and e2 ¸ 0 so
e2 ¸ e1 ¡ ° and hence
e2¡e1+°
2° ¸ 0. In our experiment, we set e = 48 and ° = 50.
7In their related work, Abeler et al. (2009) and Crawford and Meng (2010) make an equivalent separability
assumption. In contrast to the standard labor literature where agents vary their hours of work, in our setting the
time spent on the task is ¯xed and therefore only the intensity of e®ort can a®ect the valuation of the prize: thus
standard complementarities or substitutabilities between leisure and consumption do not apply directly.
7winning (as u2(v) can incorporate this joy of winning), if she is inequity averse over monetary
payo®s (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) or if she is loss averse around a ¯xed reference point (the
last two follow as the utility to winning or losing can be rede¯ned to incorporate a comparison
to a ¯xed reference point or to the payo® of the First Mover). The result also holds if u2(y2)
incorporates an impact of winning or losing on the utility function in any later tournaments,
e.g., via changes in wealth or the reference point.
3.3 Disappointment Aversion
Models of disappointment aversion (e.g., Bell, 1985; Loomes and Sugden, 1986; Delqui¶ e and Cillo,
2006; K} oszegi and Rabin, 2006, 2007) build on the idea that agents are sensitive to deviations
from their expectations, su®ering a psychological loss when they receive less than expected and
experiencing elation when they receive more. Furthermore, agents anticipate these losses and
gains when deciding how to behave.
We follow the literature in embedding disappointment aversion in a loss aversion-type frame-
work. Suppose that the Second Mover compares her material utility u2(y2) to a reference level
of utility R2, su®ering losses when u2(y2) is less than this reference point and enjoying gains
when u2(y2) exceeds the reference point. Speci¯cally, total utility U2 is given by8;9
U2(y2;R2;e2) = u2(y2)+ 1u2(y2)¸R2G2(u2(y2)¡ R2)+ 1u2(y2)·R2L2(u2(y2) ¡ R2) ¡ C2(e2); (4)
where the loss function L2(x) < 0 for x < 0, the gain function G2(x) ¸ 0 for x > 0 and
G2(0) = L2(0) = 0. The utility arising from the comparison of u2(y2) to the reference point is
termed gain-loss utility. The Second Mover is said to be loss averse if losses due to downward
departures from the reference point are more painful than equal-sized upward departures are
pleasurable, i.e., G2(x) < jL2(¡x)j for all x > 0. The Second Mover is ¯rst-order loss averse
if she is loss averse in the limit as the deviations from the reference point go to zero, i.e.,
limx"0 L0
2(x) > limx#0 G0
2(x), assuming di®erentiability of gain-loss utility except at the kink
where x = 0.
Starting with Kahneman and Tversky (1979), most models of loss aversion take the reference
point to be ¯xed exogenously, for example assuming it to be equal to the status quo. We noted
above that the utility formulation (2) is °exible enough to incorporate loss aversion around a
¯xed reference point. Thus, a ¯xed reference point does not introduce any interdependence
between the e®orts of the First and Second Movers (to see that Proposition 1 continues to hold,
note that if u2(y2) in (2) is rede¯ned to include gain-loss utility, the analysis proceeds as before).
Instead of holding a ¯xed reference point, we assume that a disappointment averse Second
8Kahneman and Tversky (1979)'s Prospect Theory incorporates a loss averse value function de¯ned only over
losses and gains relative to the reference point, while we follow the disappointment aversion literature in de¯ning
total utility over both material utility and gain-loss utility arising from the comparison of material utility to the
reference point.
9By modeling each tournament as a one-shot interaction, we are assuming that our subjects frame each
tournament narrowly, i.e., they compare the outcome of each tournament to their reference point in isolation. In
our setting, each interaction is one-shot and uncertainty is resolved immediately: at the end of each tournament,
the subjects ¯nd out whether they won or lost and then get rematched with a new rival. Models and tests of loss
aversion generally incorporate narrow framing, either implicitly or explicitly (DellaVigna, 2009) and the literature
on narrow framing suggests that attitudes towards small gambles can only be explained by loss aversion together
with the narrow framing of individual gambles (Barberis et al., 2006).
8Mover is loss averse around an endogenous reference point equal to her expected material utility
given the e®ort levels that are actually chosen, so
R2 = E[u2(y2)je2;e1]: (5)
Thus a Second Mover's reference point will be sensitive to both the e®ort chosen by the First
Mover and her own e®ort, and when optimizing the Second Mover understands that her e®ort
choice a®ects her reference point. Notice that the endogeneity of the expectation is crucial. If
the Second Mover starts with a reference point equal to a prior expectation which is invariant
to the e®ort levels that are actually chosen, the reference point is ¯xed so, as explained above,
Proposition 1 still holds. Instead, our reference point adjusts to the agents' choices: in the
terminology of K} oszegi and Rabin (2007) the reference point is choice-acclimating.10
To operationalize our model, we linearize material utility and gain-loss utility.11 We assume
that u2(y2) = y2, so material utility is linear in money and the Second Mover's reference point
becomes her expected monetary payo®, i.e.,
R2 = vP2(e2;e1): (6)
Furthermore, we assume that the gain-loss utility arising from the comparison of u2(y2) to the
reference point is piece-wise linear, with a constant slope of g2 in the gain domain and l2 in the
loss domain. With piece-wise linearity, loss aversion implies that l2 > g2, so losses are more
painful than same-sized gains are pleasurable.12 Thus we de¯ne disappointment aversion as
follows.13
De¯nition 1 A disappointment averse Second Mover is loss averse around her expected mone-
tary payo®, so ¸2 ´ l2 ¡g2, which measures the strength of disappointment aversion, is strictly
positive.
10Technically our game is psychological as the Second Mover's utility depends on her beliefs about the chosen
e®orts via the reference point. In particular, our game falls under Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2009)'s framework
of a dynamic psychological game as utility depends on terminal node (ex post) beliefs, which are pinned down by
the chosen e®orts, so beliefs can update during the course of the game.
11Given the experimental stakes are small, we believe this comes at a low cost.
12With piece-wise linearity, loss aversion and ¯rst-order loss aversion are equivalent. If l2 = g2, gains and losses
relative to the reference point cancel out in expectation, so the agent acts as if she had standard preferences.
13Our model of disappointment aversion directly extends the single-agent set-up of Bell (1985) to our competitive
environment. Our formulation is also equivalent to that of Delqui¶ e and Cillo (2006) and the choice-acclimating
model of K} oszegi and Rabin (2007, Section IV); it is straightforward to show that in a linear environment with
only two outcomes, the reference lottery approach in those papers is equivalent to using a single reference point
given by the endogenous expected payo®. We use the same parameterization as Bell (1985) and Delqui¶ e and
Cillo (2006); Section 4.3.6 explains the equivalence between our parameterization and that used by K} oszegi and
Rabin (2007). Although in the same spirit, our model of disappointment is slightly di®erent to that of Loomes
and Sugden (1986) who do not allow a kink in utility, but instead use a disappointment/elation function which is
non-linear around the endogenous expected payo®. Finally, K} oszegi and Rabin (2006)'s model does not predict
a discouragement e®ect as in their \personal equilibrium" the reference point is taken to be ¯xed at the point of
optimization.
9We can then express a disappointment averse Second Mover's expected utility as
EU2(e2;e1) = P2(v + g2(v ¡ vP2)) + (1 ¡ P2)(0 + l2(0 ¡ vP2)) ¡ C2(e2)
= vP2 ¡ ¸2vP2(1 ¡ P2) ¡ C2(e2); (7)
and we let
¤2(e2;e1) ´ ¡¸2vP2(1 ¡ P2) (8)
represent the extra term introduced into expected utility by disappointment aversion. We call ¤2
the Second Mover's disappointment de¯cit as it is always negative for ¸2 > 0 (strictly negative
for Pi = 2 f0;1g). For a given prize v the disappointment de¯cit is proportional to v2P2(1¡P2), the
variance of the Second Mover's two-point distribution of monetary payo®s. A disappointment
averse Second Mover dislikes variance in her monetary payo® as losses relative to her expected
payo® loom larger than gains. (With risk aversion, agents care only about their probability of
winning as there are only two possible outcomes.)
The variance is strictly concave in P2 and maximized at P2 = 1
2. When e®orts are such
that the Second Mover has zero probability of winning, the Second Mover has a reference point
of zero and her realized payo® equals her reference point; she is never disappointed and never
receives more than expected. Hence her disappointment de¯cit is zero. Starting at zero, a small
increase in her probability of winning leads to a large increase in the variance of her monetary
payo®. Further increases in the probability of winning towards 1
2 lead to further yet smaller
increases in the variance. At P2 = 1
2 the variance is at its highest so the disappointment de¯cit
is at its most negative - irrespective of whether she wins or loses the Second Mover's realized
payo® is very di®erent from her expected payo®. Starting at P2 = 1
2 increases in the probability
of winning reduce the variance, initially by small amounts, and then by larger amounts as the
probability of winning approaches 1.
For any value of the Second Mover's e®ort, an increase in the First Mover's e®ort reduces
the Second Mover's probability of winning. The variance therefore increases faster in P2 (when
P2 < 1
2) or falls less fast in P2 (when P2 > 1
2), so the Second Mover has a lower marginal
incentive to exert e®ort (given her e®ort always has the same marginal e®ect on her probability
of winning). We thus have a discouragement e®ect, which is crucial to our identi¯cation strategy:
a disappointment averse Second Mover responds negatively to the First Mover's e®ort, so the
harder the First Mover works the more the Second Mover shies away from exerting e®ort. Thus
First and Second Mover e®orts are strategic substitutes.14
Proposition 2 When the Second Mover is disappointment averse, higher First Mover e®ort
discourages the Second Mover: the Second Mover's optimal e®ort e¤
2 is always (weakly) decreasing
in the First Mover's e®ort e1.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
Up to now we have imposed no assumptions on the shape of the cost of e®ort function. In
order to derive an analytical expression for how the Second Mover responds to the First Mover's
14It is straightforward to extend the proof of Proposition 2 to show that if ¸2 were negative, the Second Mover
would respond positively to the First Mover's e®ort.
10e®ort, and to see how the slope of the reaction function changes in the value of the prize and
the strength of disappointment aversion, we now assume a quadratic cost of e®ort function:





With this cost function, the Second Mover's objective function will be everywhere convex or
everywhere concave. With strict convexity, the Second Mover will always set e®ort at a corner.
Instead we focus here on the case of strict concavity, which allows interior optima, showing that
the discouragement e®ect becomes stronger as the Second Mover becomes more disappointment
averse or the value of the prize goes up.
Proposition 3 Suppose a disappointment averse Second Mover has a quadratic cost function
(given by (9)) and a strictly concave objective function, i.e., 2°2c ¡ ¸2v > 0. When the action








which becomes strictly more negative in the strength of disappointment aversion ¸2 and the value
of the prize v. When the action space is discrete, the discrete analogue of the reaction function
behaves similarly.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
These e®ects are intuitive. Referring back to (8) we see that the disappointment de¯cit term
becomes more negative in the strength of disappointment aversion ¸2 and the value of the prize
v, so the Second Mover becomes more sensitive to First Mover e®ort as v and ¸2 go up.
4 Empirical Analysis
4.1 Overview and Sample Description
We use the data set collected from the laboratory experiment described in Section 2 to test
our theory of disappointment aversion. In Section 4.2 we show in a reduced form setting that,
as predicted by our theory of disappointment aversion, Second Movers respond negatively to
the e®ort choice of the First Mover they are paired with and that the strength of this e®ect
is increasing in the value of the prize. In Section 4.3 we use structural modeling to estimate
the strength of disappointment aversion on average and the heterogeneity in disappointment
aversion across the population. As outlined in the Introduction and Section 2.1, our estimation
strategies exploit identifying variation obtained from the properties of our slider task together
with the experimental design.15
We analyze the behavior of Second Movers conditional on the e®ort choices of the First
Movers. As noted in Section 3.1, this allows us to abstract from any game-theoretic consid-
15Evidence from the ¯eld, in which agents operate in a natural environment, would complement our laboratory
¯ndings. See Levitt and List (2007) for a discussion of the relationship between laboratory and ¯eld evidence
more generally.
11erations as the Second Movers face a pure optimization problem. This conditional analysis is
su±cient for the purpose of identifying the presence and strength of disappointment aversion.
Moreover, solving for the optimal behavior of the First Movers would require further assumptions
concerning the First Movers' beliefs about the unobserved characteristics and behavior of the
Second Movers. We avoid these issues, together with the associated computational complexities
and potential sources of misspeci¯cation, when performing a conditional analysis of the Second
Mover e®ort choices.16
As explained in Section 2.1, we interpret the number of sliders correctly positioned by a
subject within the allotted time, i.e., the points score, as the e®ort exerted by the subject in the
task. While the slider task provides a ¯nely gradated measure of e®ort, e®ort is still discrete.
We emphasize that this discreteness is entirely unproblematic. Indeed, the above theoretical
framework encompasses both discrete and continuous e®ort choices, and the testable implications
of our theory of disappointment aversion apply irrespective of whether e®ort is discrete or
continuous. In addition, as detailed below, discrete e®ort choices are easily accommodated in
our structural model.
Paying
Mean(e1) SD(e1) Mean(e2) SD(e2)
Minimum Maximum
Round e1 e2 e1 e2
1 22.034 5.991 21.763 6.101 1 0 33 34
2 22.627 6.708 23.458 4.836 0 11 33 33
3 24.763 6.075 24.831 4.875 0 12 37 38
4 24.627 5.956 25.203 4.502 0 16 35 36
5 24.966 6.800 25.119 5.660 0 0 36 35
6 24.729 7.508 24.898 7.039 1 0 37 39
7 25.881 5.855 25.763 6.109 9 0 37 37
8 26.831 5.858 26.169 5.133 9 14 41 35
9 25.593 8.550 26.254 6.702 0 0 38 40
10 26.322 6.781 26.729 5.988 1 0 40 39
Notes: SD denotes standard deviation and e1 and e2 denote, respectively, First and Second Mover e®ort.
Table 1: Summary of First and Second Mover e®orts.
From the laboratory sessions we collected data on 60 First Movers and 60 Second Movers,
each observed for 10 paying rounds, with re-pairing between rounds as detailed in Section 2.2.
One Second Mover appears to have been unable to position any sliders at exactly 50.17 Through-
out our analysis this subject is dropped, except for the purpose of showing that our results are
robust to our sample selection. Table 1 summarizes the behavior of the 59 Second Movers and
the corresponding First Movers in each round. E®orts range between 0 and 41 sliders for First
16Similar problems would arise if we attempted to identify disappointment aversion from responses to the
prize in a simultaneous-move tournament. Furthermore, in a simultaneous-move context, even if all subjects
were identical disappointment aversion would be di±cult to identify as symmetric and asymmetric pure-strategy
equilibria co-exist for certain values of the prize and subjects might play mixed-strategy equilibria.
17The data show that this subject was moving sliders around throughout the session but failed to position any
sliders at exactly 50 in either the practice rounds or in the paying rounds. This subject also experienced problems
when entering his/her Participant ID number.
12Movers and 0 and 40 sliders for Second Movers. Within each round, on average First and Second
Movers exert roughly the same e®ort, with average e®ort increasing from around 22 sliders to
just under 27 sliders over the 10 rounds.
4.2 Reduced Form Analysis
We use a panel data regression to examine whether Second Movers respond to the e®ort choice
of the First Mover they are paired with. Exploiting Proposition 1, we hypothesize that if Second
Movers are not disappointment averse then the observed e®orts of the Second Movers will not
depend on the corresponding First Mover e®orts once controls for the prize and round e®ects
are included.18 Alternatively, if subjects are disappointment averse then Proposition 2 implies a
negative dependence of observed Second Mover e®orts on the corresponding First Mover e®orts,
again conditional on controls for the prize and round e®ects.
To explore how Second Movers respond to First Mover e®ort we estimate the following linear
random e®ects panel data model:
e2;n;r = ¯1+¯2vn;r+¯3e1;n;r+¯4e1;n;r£vn;r+dr+!n+²n;r for n = 1;:::;N; r = 1;:::;10; (11)
where n and r index, respectively, Second Movers and paying rounds, and N denotes the total
number of Second Movers. e1;n;r is the e®ort of the First Mover paired with the nth Second
Mover in the rth round, and vn;r is the prize draw for the nth Second Mover in the rth round.
The prize, the First Mover's e®ort and the First Mover's e®ort interacted with the prize are
included as explanatory variables. The inclusion of the interaction of the prize and the First
Mover's e®ort is motivated by Proposition 3 which shows that in the case of a quadratic cost
of e®ort function the negative e®ect of the First Mover's e®ort on the Second Mover's optimal
e®ort is larger at higher prizes. Additionally, the equation includes a set of round dummies
denoted by dr for r = 1;:::;10, with the ¯rst paying round providing the omitted category, to
capture systematic di®erences between rounds which are common across Second Movers, and
round invariant Second Mover speci¯c e®ects denoted !n for n = 1;:::;N to capture systematic
di®erences between Second Movers. Lastly, ²n;r is an unobservable that varies over rounds and
over Second Movers and captures di®erences between rounds in a Second Mover's e®ort choice
that cannot be attributed to the other terms in the model. !n is assumed to be identically and
independently distributed over Second Movers with a variance ¾2
!, while ²n;r is assumed to be
identically and independently distributed over rounds and Second Movers with a variance ¾2
².
Table 2 reports estimates of the parameters appearing in (11). The results for the preferred
sample show a negative e®ect of First Mover e®ort on Second Mover e®ort. In more detail, at low
prizes First Mover e®ort does not signi¯cantly a®ect Second Mover e®ort, while at high prizes
there is a large and signi¯cant discouragement e®ect as predicted by our theory of disappointment
aversion. Application of the Delta method reveals that the e®ect of First Mover e®ort on Second
Mover e®ort is not signi¯cant at the 5% level for prizes less than $2, is signi¯cant at the 5%
level for prizes between $2 and $2.60, and is signi¯cant at the 1% level for prizes of $2.70
and above. For the highest prize of $3.90 a 40 slider increase in First Mover e®ort decreases
18We note however that First and Second Mover e®orts will not be unconditionally independent in the presence
of prize and round e®ects which impact on both pair members.
13Second Mover e®ort by approximately 6 sliders, a 24% decrease relative to the average e®ort of
25 sliders.19 Furthermore, there is a large and signi¯cant positive prize e®ect, and we ¯nd that
the persistent unobserved individual characteristics explain more of the variation in behavior
than the transitory unobservables.20
Preferred Sample Full Sample
59 Second Movers 60 Second Movers
Coe±cient Standard Error Coe±cient Standard Error
First Mover e®ort 0:044 0.049 0.047 0.049
Prize 1:639¤¤¤ 0.602 1:655¤¤¤ 0.592
Prize£First Mover e®ort ¡0:049¤¤ 0.023 ¡0:050¤¤ 0.023
Intercept 19:777¤¤¤ 1.400 19:392¤¤¤ 1.447
¾! 4.288 5.342
¾² 3.852 3.826
N £ R 590 600
Hausman test for random 2.60 2.43




¤¤¤ denote signi¯cance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. df denotes degrees of freedom.
Both speci¯cations further include dummy variables for each of rounds 2-10 inclusive. The coe±cients
on these variables are between 1.7 and 5.2, signi¯cantly greater than zero, and tend to increase over the
rounds.
Table 2: Random e®ects regressions for Second Mover e®ort.
We note that, although the parameters reported in Table 2 were estimated from a linear
random e®ects model, an alternative speci¯cation in which round invariant Second Mover speci¯c
e®ects are treated as ¯xed e®ects yields almost indistinguishable results. This is because Second
Mover speci¯c e®ects are uncorrelated with the prize and the First Mover e®orts due to the
experimental design. Finally, Table 2 shows that including the 60th Second Mover does not
change conclusions concerning signi¯cance, and nor does this have substantial e®ects on the
coe±cient estimates.
4.3 Structural Modeling
Structural modeling seeks to ¯t the theoretical model with disappointment aversion presented
above in Section 3.3 to the experimental sample. In contrast to the reduced form analysis above,
structural modeling recovers estimates of the strength of disappointment aversion on average and
the population-level heterogeneity in disappointment aversion. Below we describe our preferred
19We use a 40 slider increase as an illustrative example as First Mover e®orts ranged from 0 to about 40 (see
Table 1).
20To test whether behavior changes during the course of the experiment due to learning about the payo®
function, we also estimated the model with separate coe±cients on First Mover e®ort and First Mover e®ort
interacted with the prize for the ¯rst ¯ve rounds of the experiment and for the ¯nal ¯ve rounds. The parameters
corresponding to the ¯rst half of the experiment are not statistically signi¯cantly di®erent from those corresponding
to the second half (p value of 0.710). We further estimated the model excluding all prize controls, and found a
negative but statistically insigni¯cant e®ect of First Mover e®ort on Second Mover e®ort: both First and Second
Mover e®orts are positively correlated with the prize, so without prize controls the coe±cient on First Mover
e®ort is biased upward as it picks up part of the e®ect of the prize on Second Mover e®ort.
14empirical speci¯cation, our estimation strategy, including a discussion of identi¯cation, and our
results. We then proceed to explore robustness to the speci¯cation of the reference point and
of the cost of e®ort function. Finally, we relate our estimate of the disappointment aversion
parameter to existing measures of loss aversion around ¯xed reference points.
4.3.1 Preferred Empirical Speci¯cation
We use ¸2;n to denote the disappointment aversion parameter of the nth Second Mover. In this
speci¯cation the strength of disappointment aversion may vary between subjects; however, for
a given subject the strength of disappointment is constant over rounds. We adopt the following
speci¯cation for ¸2;n:
¸2;n » N(e ¸2;¾2
¸) for n = 1;:::;N; (12)
and further assume that ¸2;n is independent over Second Movers. The parameter e ¸2 represents
the strength of disappointment aversion on average, and ¾2
¸ denotes the variance of the strength
of disappointment aversion in the population.
The cost of e®ort function is assumed to be quadratic, as in (9). The parameter b is assumed
to be constant over rounds and common to Second Movers, while unobserved cost di®erences
between Second Movers and learning e®ects enter the cost of e®ort function through the con-
vexity parameter c. cn;r denotes the convexity parameter of the nth Second Mover in the rth
round and takes the following form:
cn;r = · + ±r + ¹n + ¼n;r for n = 1;:::;N; r = 1;:::;10: (13)
In the above · denotes the component of cn;r which is common across Second Movers and
rounds. ±r for r = 1;:::;10 are round e®ects, with the ¯rst paying round providing the omitted
category. These round dummies allow the marginal costs of the ¯rst and later units of e®ort to
vary over rounds at the population level. A cost of e®ort that is declining over rounds due to
learning is represented by values of ±r which are negative and decreasing over rounds. ¹n denotes
unobserved di®erences in the cost of e®ort functions across Second Movers that are constant over
rounds. For the purpose of estimation ¹n is assumed to be independent over Second Movers
and to have a Weibull distribution with scale parameter Á¹ and shape parameter '¹. The ¯nal
term in the cost function is ¼n;r which represents unobserved di®erences in Second Movers' cost
of e®ort functions that vary over rounds as well as over Second Movers. ¼n;r is assumed to
be independent over Second Movers and rounds and to have a Weibull distribution with scale
parameter Á¼ and shape parameter '¼. The Weibull distribution is a °exible two parameter
distribution that has positive support, thus allowing us to impose convex cost of e®ort functions
on all Second Movers when estimating the model.21
Given this parameterization of the theoretical model, the structural model has 17 unknown
parameters, corresponding to the parameters describing disappointment aversion, e ¸2 and ¾¸, the
21In the preferred speci¯cation we use round-speci¯c cost of e®ort functions; however, we also estimated the
model with a °exible cost of e®ort function de¯ned over a Second Mover's total number of completed sliders during
the paying rounds, x. Speci¯cally, the cost of e®ort function was given by bx +
cxÃ
Ã where, as in the preferred
speci¯cation, c included Weibull distributed subject-speci¯c random e®ects. The Newey test for the validity of
overidentifying restrictions ¯rmly rejected this speci¯cation.
15common cost parameters b and ·, the 9 round e®ects ±r for r = 2;:::;10 and the 4 parameters
appearing in the distribution of the unobservables in the cost of e®ort function, namely, Á¹, '¹,
Á¼ and '¼. These 17 structural parameters are collectively denoted by the vector µ.
4.3.2 Estimation Strategy and Identi¯cation
We estimate the 17 unknown parameters using the Method of Simulated Moments (MSM) (Mc-
Fadden, 1989; Pakes and Pollard, 1989). The analytic complexity of choice probabilities, due
to the multiple sources of unobserved heterogeneity, precludes the use of Maximum Likelihood
and Method of Moments estimation techniques. MSM, in contrast, uses easily computed fea-
tures of the sample as the basis for estimating the unknown parameters. Formally, the sample
observations are used to compute a k £1 dimensional vector of moments, with k ¸ 17, denoted
M. Critically, every moment included in M should depend at least in part on one or more
endogenous variables. The researcher has considerable discretion over the moments included in
M; however M typically includes period speci¯c averages of endogenous variables, here the e®ort
choices of the Second Movers in each round, together with correlations between the endogenous
variables and the explanatory variables.
MSM proceeds by generating S simulated samples. Each simulated sample contains N
Second Movers each observed for 10 rounds. In each simulated sample the Second Movers face
the same prizes and First Mover e®orts as observed in the actual sample. The behavior of the
Second Movers in the simulated samples is determined from the structural model using a trial
value, µt, of the values of the unknown parameters, µ. In particular, unobservables are assigned
to Second Movers in accordance with the above described distributions. For each Second Mover
and each round, the expected utility is calculated for each feasible Second Mover e®ort choice,
and the simulated e®ort choice is the action with the highest expected utility. Further details
concerning the construction of the simulated samples are provided in Appendix B.1.
The behavior of the Second Movers in the simulated samples is then compared to the behavior
of the actual experimental subjects. Speci¯cally, for each of the S simulated samples the vector
of moments Ms(µt) is computed. These are the same k moments as computed for the observed
sample. The simulated moments Ms are a function of the parameters µt used to simulate the
behavior of the Second Movers as di®erent values of the parameters imply di®erent optimal




provides a summary of the behavior of Second Movers in the simulated samples. The process of
averaging over the S simulated samples reduces the e®ect of simulation noise on the simulated




















where WN is a ¯xed k £ k dimensional positive semide¯nite weighting matrix. The quantity
J(µt) provides a scalar measure of the distance between the observed behavior of the actual
experimental subjects and the behavior of the Second Movers in the simulated samples at the
trial parameter vector µt. The MSM estimator of µ, denoted b µ, is the value of µt that minimizes
J(µt): b µ = argminµtJ(µt). Thus MSM estimates the structural parameters to be such that the
16behavior of Second Movers simulated on the basis of the structural model is as similar as possible
to the behavior of the actual Second Movers as observed in sample.
Under the conditions of Pakes and Pollard (1989), the MSM estimator is consistent and
asymptotically normal for any consistent weight matrix WN. We use a weight matrix with
diagonal elements equal to the inverse of N times the variances of the sample moments and zeros
elsewhere and use bootstrap sampling of Second Movers with replacement to estimate WN.22
Further details pertaining to the properties of the MSM estimator and estimation routine are
presented in Appendix B.2.
We use 38 moments to estimate the 17 structural parameters. The moments are described in
Table 4 in Appendix B.3. Correlations between Second Mover e®ort and First Mover e®ort and
between Second Mover e®ort and First Mover e®ort interacted with the prize provide identifying
information about e ¸2, the parameter describing the strength of disappointment aversion on av-
erage. Percentiles of Second Mover speci¯c correlations provide information about the standard
deviation of disappointment aversion in the population, ¾¸. The correlation between Second
Mover e®ort and the prize helps to identify ·, which measures the component of the convexity
of the cost of e®ort function common to Second Movers and rounds, while the associated per-
centiles help to identify the shape of the distributions of the unobserved cost di®erences between
Second Movers. Moments pertaining to the marginal distribution of Second Mover e®ort, such
as round speci¯c means and the standard deviation, provide further identifying information.
4.3.3 Results
The upper left panel of Table 3 reports the parameter estimates for the preferred speci¯cation.
Before discussing the results we brie°y consider the goodness of ¯t of the preferred speci¯cation,
presented in Table 5 located in Appendix B.3. Table 5 shows that all ¯tted moments correspond
closely to the values observed in the sample: in particular the z test statistics show that the
observed and ¯tted moments never di®er by more than 1.2 bootstrapped standard deviations.
Consistent with this, the Newey test for the validity of overidentifying restrictions (OI test),
reported in Table 3, does not reject the validity of the preferred speci¯cation.
Turning to the parameter estimates for the preferred speci¯cation, our estimate of the
strength of disappointment aversion on average, e ¸2, is 1.729 and this is signi¯cantly di®er-
ent from zero at all conventional signi¯cance levels.23 In Section 4.3.6 we place this estimate
in the context of the related literature but we note here that a ¯gure of 1.729 is in line with
previous studies which estimate the strength of loss aversion around a ¯xed reference point.
We ¯nd that ¾¸ is signi¯cantly greater than zero, thus providing evidence for heterogeneity in
disappointment aversion across individuals. Our parameter estimates imply that ¸2;n is greater
than 3.3 for 20% of individuals, and is less than 0.2 for 20%. For 17% of individuals, ¸2;n is less
than zero.
22Using instead the optimally weighed minimum distance estimator improves e±ciency but can introduce con-
siderable ¯nite sample bias (see Altonji and Segal, 1996).
23We follow most of the literature in using the term \disappointment aversion" to describe this kink in utility
around a choice-acclimating expectations-based reference point; we note, however, that our empirical results
provide no direct evidence about the psychological processes which might underlie the kink.
17Preferred Non-Quadratic Normally Distributed
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¤¤¤ denote signi¯cance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Where applicable, standard
deviations of the transitory and persistent unobservables in the cost of e®ort function, ¾¼ and ¾¹, are
computed from the estimates of the parameters of the Weibull distribution. Estimates of ·, ¾¼ and ¾¹
have been multiplied by 100.
Note 2: All speci¯cations further include dummy variables for each of rounds 2-10 inclusive. In the
preferred speci¯cation, the coe±cients on these variables, scaled as per ·, are between -0.1 and -0.5, sig-
ni¯cantly less than zero, and tend to decrease over the rounds.
Note 3: Reaction functions and their gradients were obtained using simulation methods. Using the esti-
mated parameters of the cost of e®ort function for round 5, we simulated a large number of hypothetical
Second Mover optimal e®orts conditional on speci¯c values of First Mover e®ort and the prize, and com-
puted the mean best response. The reaction functions are linear, except in the case of non-quadratic e®ort




th percentiles of the distribution of ¸2;n.
Note 4: The construction of the test statistic for the validity of overidentifying restrictions (OI test) is
detailed in Newey (1985). p values are shown in brackets.
Note 5: Unless stated otherwise, all results were obtained using our preferred sample of 59 Second Movers.
Table 3: MSM parameter estimates.
18The results further show that the cost of e®ort function exhibits signi¯cant convexity. In
addition there is signi¯cant transitory and permanent variation over Second Movers in the cost of
e®ort, with persistent unobserved di®erences being more important than transitory di®erences.24
Our estimate of b, the linear component of the cost of e®ort function, is negative, indicating
that the cost of e®ort is declining at low e®ort levels. This negative coe±cient is required to ¯t
accurately observed average Second Mover e®ort. However, the linear component of the cost of
e®ort function does not a®ect how Second Movers respond to the First Movers' e®orts. Moreover,
it is not surprising that the cost of e®ort is at ¯rst declining as the experimental subjects have
self-selected into participating in the experiment and the outside option during the task is to do
nothing for 120 seconds. Other experiments have also found that subjects derive some utility
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(b) Prize=$3:90.
Notes: We illustrate the reaction functions over the range 0 to 40 sliders as Table 1 shows First Mover e®orts
varied over this range. Note 3 to Table 3 explains how these reaction functions are constructed. Error bars are
omitted; standard errors for the average ¸2;n case in sub¯gure (a) and for the high ¸2;n case in sub¯gure (b) are re-
ported in Table 3. Low, average and high ¸2;n refer to the 20
th, 50
th and 80
th percentiles of the distribution of ¸2;n.
Figure 3: Reaction functions implied by the preferred speci¯cation of the structural model.
Figure 3 shows the extent to which heterogeneity in disappointment aversion translates into
di®erences in mean Second Mover responses to First Mover e®ort, evaluated at the average prize
of $2 and at the highest prize of $3:90. Second Movers with low values of ¸2;n, de¯ned to be
the 20th percentile of the distribution of ¸2;n, do not respond appreciably to changes in First
Mover e®ort. In contrast, we observe a signi¯cant discouragement e®ect (at the 1% level) for
Second Movers with average values of ¸2;n, or with high values, de¯ned to be the 80th percentile
of the distribution of ¸2;n. At the highest prize of $3:90, a 40 slider increase in First Mover
e®ort decreases optimal Second Mover e®ort by 2.5 sliders for an individual with the average
¸2;n, and by 5.1 sliders for an individual with a high ¸2;n. In the context of an average Second
Mover e®ort of 25, these e®ects represent reductions of 10% and 20% respectively in optimal
24The magnitude and signi¯cance of the parameters controlling the persistent unobservables are indicative of
the importance of our assumptions about persistent unobserved heterogeneity; to con¯rm their importance, we
also estimated a simpler model (parameter estimates not reported) in which all unobserved heterogeneity comes
through a mean zero normally distributed error term, assumed to be independent over both rounds and subjects,
and found that the Newey test rejects this speci¯cation (p value of 0.000).
19Second Mover e®ort.25
It is important to emphasize that the impact of disappointment aversion on Second Movers'
average monetary payo® is small. Given the estimated Second Mover cost of e®ort function and
the observed distribution of First Mover e®orts and prizes, the Second Movers would each have
earned just under $0:01 more on average over the course of the experiment had they not been
disappointment averse. Nonetheless, we do ¯nd that disappointment aversion induces a signif-
icant discouragement e®ect and the impact on behavior is big enough to allow us to estimate
the strength of disappointment aversion on average and the heterogeneity in disappointment
aversion across the population. Furthermore, given the estimated parameters of our model and
the observed First Mover e®orts and prizes, Second Movers would be willing to pay about $0:79
each on average per round to rid themselves of disappointment aversion. This has important
implications for the design of labor market incentive schemes, as employers will be keen to
design schemes which lower workers' expected disappointment in order to soften their partic-
ipation constraint. For example, Gill and Stone (2010, Section 5.2) consider how worker loss
aversion around expectations-based reference points impacts on an employer's choice of relative
performance incentive contract.
4.3.4 Robustness: Own-Choice-Acclimating Reference Point
The expectations-based reference point in our model adjusts to both the First Mover's and the
Second Mover's e®ort choices. Thus our ¯nding of signi¯cant disappointment aversion provides
evidence of loss aversion around choice-acclimating reference points when agents compete.
With a ¯xed reference point, including one given by a prior expectation, Proposition 1 shows
that we should observe no discouragement e®ect. However, if the expectations-based reference
point adjusted only to the First Mover's e®ort, there would still exist a discouragement e®ect.26
In order to test whether the expectations-based reference point adjusts only to the First Mover's
e®ort, we generalize the reference point (6) as follows for ® 2 [0;1]:
R2 = ®vP2(e2;e1) + (1 ¡ ®)vP2(e e2;e1); (15)
where e e2 is ¯xed, and so does not adjust to the Second Mover's choice of e®ort (e e2 could for
instance arise from a prior expectation).
We re-estimate our model, simultaneously estimating ® as well as the 17 other parameters
from the preferred speci¯cation.27 The bottom lower and bottom middle panels of Table 3 show
that we estimate ® to be close to 1, so the Second Movers place little weight on the part of the
25The magnitudes of the estimated slopes are somewhat lower than the corresponding estimates implied by
the reduced form analysis in Section 4.2. This is because MSM seeks to ¯t simultaneously a variety of di®erent
moments. If we arbitrarily put a higher weight on the moments identifying these slopes, the estimated magnitudes
would be larger.
26Similarly, in Abeler et al. (2009) the main empirical ¯ndings are consistent with a reference point which
adjusts to the ¯xed payment but not the subjects' e®ort choices.
27With this more general reference point, the ¯xed e e2 and the slope of gain-loss utility in the gain domain, g2,
become relevant to the determination of the level of e®ort (but not to how the Second Movers respond to First
Mover e®ort). As g2 and e e2 are not identi¯ed under the null that ® = 1, we do not attempt to estimate these
parameters, instead estimating the model for various values of g2 and e e2. Results for g2 = 0 and g2 = 1 with e e2
equal to the average level of e®ort of 25 are reported in Table 3. We further estimated the model with g2 =
1
2,
and also with e e2 = 0 together with di®erent values of g2. The results were not substantially di®erent.
20reference point that does not adjust to their own e®ort choice. Moreover, the estimates of ® are
signi¯cantly di®erent from zero at the 1% level. We argue that this provides strong evidence
that the Second Movers' reference points are indeed own-choice-acclimatizing, as assumed in the
preferred speci¯cation.
4.3.5 Further Robustness
The remaining panels in Table 3 provide further robustness checks for various features of our
analysis. The upper middle panel of Table 3 reports the results for a speci¯cation in which the





Ã , where Ã is an additional parameter to be estimated. We estimate Ã to be approximately
2.5.28 In the upper right panel, we report estimates of a speci¯cation in which the unobservables
appearing in the cost of e®ort function are normally distributed, rather than being drawn from
Weibull distributions. The Newey test for the validity of overidentifying restrictions (OI test)
rejects this speci¯cation, which illustrates the °exibility of the Weibull distribution. Finally,
the bottom right panel shows results obtained for the preferred speci¯cation but estimated with
the full sample of 60 Second Movers (see Footnote 17 for details concerning the omitted Second
Mover).
We see that irrespective of the choice of sample and the speci¯cation of the cost of e®ort
function our estimate of the strength of disappointment aversion on average e ¸2 is signi¯cantly
di®erent from zero. Also, all speci¯cations show signi¯cant variation across individuals in the
strength of disappointment aversion. Finally, the estimated response of a Second Mover to a
change in First Mover e®ort varies little across speci¯cations.
4.3.6 Relationship to Existing Estimates of Loss Aversion
The endogeneity of the reference point means that behavior in our model is driven by the
size of the kink in gain-loss utility ¸2 = l2 ¡ g2. Other models of choice-acclimating reference
points share the same feature. To see this, we introduce K} oszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007)'s
parameterization, which involves a weighting on gain-loss utility relative to material utility,
´ ¸ 0, and a coe±cient of loss aversion for gain-loss utility, ¸, which measures the ratio of the
slopes of gain-loss utility alone in the loss and gain domains. We estimate the size of the kink in
gain-loss utility, scaled relative to material utility, and ¸2 = ´¸¡´ = ´(¸¡1). In their model of
single-agent e®ort provision, Abeler et al. (2009)'s ¯rst-order conditions also depend on ´(¸¡1),
as do preferences over lotteries in the choice-acclimating version of K} oszegi and Rabin (2007)'s
model (see p. 1059 and Proposition 12(i)). Bell (1985)'s original disappointment aversion model
also builds on the size of the kink. We cannot estimate ¸ directly, as this coe±cient interacts
with the weight put on gain-loss utility to determine the size of the kink in gain-loss utility;
nonetheless, because we estimate that e ¸2 > 0, it follows that ´ > 0 and ¸ > 1.
28At the estimated parameters of this speci¯cation, the qualitative predictions of Proposition 3 continue to hold
numerically. For every possible First Mover e®ort, the simulated Second Mover reaction function evaluated at
the average ¸2;n becomes steeper as the prize moves from $0:10 to $2 and from $2 to $3:90. Similarly, at the
average prize of $2, the reaction function becomes steeper as we move from low ¸2;n to the average ¸2;n and from
the average ¸2;n to high ¸2;n. Note 3 to Table 3 details the construction of these reaction functions.
21Our measure of disappointment aversion is therefore not directly comparable to previous
measures of loss aversion around ¯xed reference points. Evidence from previous studies suggests
a coe±cient of loss aversion of about 2 for Kahneman and Tversky (1979)'s value function
(Kahneman, 2003), i.e., the value function is about twice as steep in the loss domain as it is
in the gain domain. For example, from choices over lotteries Tversky and Kahneman (1992)
estimate a coe±cient of 2.25 for their median subject. Kahneman and Tversky (1979)'s value
function is de¯ned only over gains and losses: if we consider this value function to include
implicitly any consumption value of losses and gains as well as psychological elation and pain
from deviating from the reference point, then the comparable ¯gure in our setting to the usual








Given an assumption about g2, our estimate of e ¸2 therefore implies an estimate of the average
value of (16) in the population. For example, if we assume that g2 2 (0;1), so the elation
associated with receiving more than expected is positive but less important than the associated
material utility, then our estimate e ¸2 = 1:729 implies that (16) 2 (1:865;2:729), which matches
previous estimates of the coe±cient of loss aversion.
5 Alternative Behavioral Explanations
Our model of disappointment aversion ¯ts our data well: as explained in Section 4.3.3, all ¯tted
moments correspond closely to the values observed in our experimental sample and the Newey
test shows that our preferred speci¯cation is not rejected by the data. This is good statisti-
cal evidence that there are not important additional factors which would help to explain our
data better. Furthermore, the burgeoning empirical literature which shows the importance of
expectations-based reference points in many di®erent contexts (summarized in the Introduction)
lends weight to our thesis that expectations might be salient when agents compete. Nonetheless,
we argue below that a number of alternative behavioral explanations of the observed discour-
agement e®ect are unconvincing.
Confusion. To test whether Second Movers understood the compensation scheme, we con-
ducted an incentivized comprehension quiz in early December 2010 using a new sample of 60
students selected randomly from the pool of subjects at the University of Arizona's Economic
Science Laboratory. The instructions and questions are reported in Appendix D. The quiz was
designed to test whether Second Movers understood that the marginal e®ect of an extra unit of
e®ort on their probability of winning did not depend on the e®ort of the First Mover they were
paired with. In particular, question 5 asked the subjects by how much a speci¯c one unit in-
crease in a Second Mover's points score increases her probability of winning given a First Mover
points score of 20, and question 10 asked the same question given a First Mover score of 30. The
data provide good evidence that most subjects understood the experimental instructions. 90%
of the subjects answered all 10 of the questions correctly. Of the 6 subjects who made at least
one mistake, half nonetheless answered questions 5 and 10 correctly and a further 2 subjects'
answers to questions 5 and 10 were incorrect but did not vary between the two questions. A
22single subject gave a lower answer for question 10 than for question 5, but overall the average
di®erence between the subjects' answers to questions 5 and 10 was not statistically signi¯cantly
di®erent from zero (p value of 0.317). Footnote 20 also provides evidence that behavior did
not change during the course of our experiment, so learning about the payo® function does not
appear to have played an important role.
Peer e®ects. Second Movers who imitate the behavior of their peers (Falk and Ichino, 2006),
or who compete by matching or beating their rival's e®ort level, would respond positively rather
than negatively to the e®ort of the First Mover they are paired with. Moreover, we ¯nd no
evidence of matching or beating. Speci¯cally, if Second Movers have a tendency to match their
rival's e®ort we should see few Second Movers completing one slider fewer or one slider more
than their rival. Similarly, if Second Movers tend to want to beat their rival's e®ort we should see
few Second Movers completing the same number of sliders or two sliders more than their rival.
Formal tests of these hypotheses reveal no signi¯cant evidence of either matching or beating
behavior.29 Furthermore, by looking at the behavior of First Movers, we provide evidence that
our estimates of disappointment aversion are not biased by a more general desire to mimic peer
behavior. In particular, we look to see whether First Movers' e®orts in a given round respond
to the e®ort of their Second Mover rivals in the previous round. A general desire to mimic
one's peers should lead to a positive relationship untainted by any role for disappointment as
the uncertainty arising from the previous round's competition has been resolved. We ¯nd no
evidence that First Movers respond to the e®ort of their peers in the previous round.30
Probability weighting. Kahneman and Tversky (1979) propose that agents apply decision
weights to probabilities, overweighting small probabilities and underweighting large ones. The
evidence further suggests that the probability weighting function w(P) is concave for probabil-
ities smaller than about 35% to 40% and convex thereafter (Wu and Gonzalez, 1996; Prelec,
1998). A Second Mover who evaluated the prospect arising from her choice of e®ort using prob-
ability weighting would show a discouragement e®ect in the convex region to the right of the
in°ection point, but an opposite encouragement e®ect in the concave region to the left of the
in°ection point.31 To test for such a pattern, we estimate the reduced form model from Sec-
tion 4.2 with separate coe±cients on First Mover e®ort and First Mover e®ort interacted with
the prize for the highest 50% of First Mover e®orts (which, on average, give rise to low Second





590 be the proportion of Second Mover e®orts for which
the di®erence between the Second Mover's e®ort and that of the First Mover she is paired with is exactly x. To
test for matching behavior we conduct two joint non-parametric bootstrapped tests. Our ¯rst test cannot reject
the null that Pr(¡1) = Pr(¡2) and Pr(¡1) = Pr(0), and the second cannot reject the null that Pr(1) = Pr(0)
and Pr(1) = Pr(2), where in each case the one-sided alternative is that the middle proportion is signi¯cantly
lower than either of the proportions above or below (or lower than both). The p values are, respectively, 0.481
and 0.937. Similarly, when testing for beating behavior, our ¯rst test cannot reject the null that Pr(0) = Pr(¡1)
and Pr(0) = Pr(1), and the second cannot reject the null that Pr(2) = Pr(1) and Pr(2) = Pr(3). The p values
are, respectively, 0.832 and 0.138.
30Speci¯cally, we estimate a reduced form model similar to (11), where First Mover e®ort depends on the prize
in the current round, the prize in the previous round, the previous round e®ort of the Second Mover that the
First Mover was paired with in the previous round and this Second Mover's e®ort interacted with the prize in the
previous round. The coe±cients on these last two are not statistically signi¯cantly di®erent from zero (p values
of 0.433 and 0.680).
31The prospect arising from an e®ort choice e2 is \simple" (one non-zero outcome) and, with u2(0) = 0, is valued










@e2 u2(v) is increasing (decreasing)
in e1 when w(P2) is concave (convex) in P2, so the Second Mover's marginal incentive to exert e®ort rises (falls)
locally in e1 for a given e2.
23Mover winning probabilities) and for the lowest 50% of First Mover e®orts (which tend to give
rise to higher Second Mover winning probabilities). The parameter estimates are of similar mag-
nitude and have the same signs as those estimated in Section 4.2; furthermore, the parameters
corresponding to the lower half of First Mover e®orts are not statistically signi¯cantly di®erent
from those corresponding to the upper half (p value of 0.830).32 This provides evidence that,
in contrast to the pattern predicted by probability weighting, the discouragement e®ect that we
observe in the data operates throughout the range of Second Mover winning probabilities.
Regret. It is not straightforward to introduce a notion of regret (Bell, 1982; Loomes and
Sugden, 1982) into our set-up as the agents have more than two possible choices and uncertainty
about the outcome of alternative choices is only partially resolved ex post (Bell, 1983, discusses
partial resolution of uncertainty in a two action model). Furthermore we believe that, because
our subjects have only limited potential to learn what would have happened in the counterfactual
in which they chose a di®erent level of e®ort, regret will not be particularly salient in the context
of our experiment; as Larrick (1993, p. 446) puts it: \expecting vivid, concrete feedback about
what de¯nitely would have occurred produces a greater potential for regret than pallid, abstract
knowledge of what statistically was likely to occur." Nonetheless, we estimate a structural model
which includes both regret and disappointment to see whether omitting regret considerations
from our preferred speci¯cation impacts on our estimate of disappointment aversion. We assume
that regret is felt when the realized payo® u2(y2)¡C2(e2) is less than the ex post expected payo®
from the ex post best alternative action.33 We ¯nd that the parameter measuring the intensity
of regret is not statistically signi¯cantly di®erent from zero (p value of 0.852). Furthermore, the
estimate of the strength of disappointment aversion e ¸2 = 1:710, which is similar to that from
the preferred speci¯cation, and we continue to ¯nd signi¯cant heterogeneity in disappointment
aversion.
Pressure. Choking under pressure (Baumeister, 1984), where an agent's performance deteri-
orates when incentives or stakes are higher, is also an implausible explanation of the discourage-
ment e®ect. First, the Second Movers' marginal incentives do not depend on First Mover e®ort,
so an incentives-based story for choking has no bite. Furthermore, if the level of the stakes
matter Second Movers should choke more when their probability of winning is higher, i.e., when
the First Mover has worked less hard.
32As noted above, the literature suggests that the probability weighting function's in°ection point lies somewhat
to the left of P = 0:5. Thus we also estimated the reduced form model with separate coe±cients for the highest
20% of First Mover e®orts (which give rise to particularly low Second Mover winning probabilities) and for the
lowest 80%. The results were similar.
33In a theoretical analysis of regret with partial resolution of uncertainty, KrÄ ahmer and Stone (2008) make the
same assumption. Formally, we estimate the same structural model as in Section 4.3.1, adding in an expected
regret term as follows
P2(e2;e1)½min
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where ½ measures the intensity of regret, e
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is the updated ex post probability of winning from having chosen e
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is the ex post probability of
winning function after losing (some updating occurs because winning or losing is somewhat informative about
whether the random draws which determine the winner were favorable or unfavorable to the Second Mover).
24Collusion and reciprocity. Even though e®ort is socially wasteful, the subjects are not able
to collude in our experiment: as explained in Section 2.2, the rotation-based matching algorithm
that we use ensures that each pair of subjects plays a truly one-shot game: the pair meets only
once and a subject's action in one round cannot have a direct or indirect e®ect on the actions
of other subjects that the subject is paired with later on. A taste for reciprocity (Rabin, 1993)
can sometimes allow agents to cooperate even in one-shot prisoners' dilemma-type games: in
our set-up, low First Mover e®ort can be considered a kind action to be reciprocated with low
e®ort, so positive reciprocity could conceivably allow the agents to coordinate on low e®ort.
However, in Section 4.3.3 we ¯nd substantial variation in subjects' e®ort costs. This variation
clouds inferences that subjects can make about a rival's intentions: subjects only meet the rival
once and so will have di±culty distinguishing the rival's kind or unkind intention from a low or
high cost of e®ort. Furthermore, our data show that Second Movers respond to a kinder action
(lower First Mover e®ort) with a meaner action (higher e®ort) instead of the kinder action (lower
e®ort) predicted by reciprocity. To the extent that the First Movers are able to signal kindness
by putting in low e®ort, the response by the Second Movers to increase e®ort will destroy any
incentive on the part of the First Movers to be kind.
In order to provide some more direct evidence that reciprocity does not play an important
role in our experiment, we look at how Second Movers respond to unexpectedly high or low
e®ort on the part of the First Mover they are paired with. Given that we ¯nd substantial
variation in our subjects' e®ort costs, it is reasonable to assume that Second Movers learn about
the distribution of First Movers' e®ort costs from the First Mover e®orts they see during the
course of the experiment. If reciprocity is playing a role, then the greater the average e®ort
seen in earlier rounds by a particular Second Mover (after allowing for the e®ects of prizes in
the earlier rounds), the lower the inferred average cost of e®ort, and hence the kinder or less
unkind any particular First Mover e®ort is perceived to be in the current round. Thus, if Second
Movers reciprocate perceived kindness or unkindness, they will want to reward any given First
Mover e®ort more or punish it less when they have observed higher First Mover e®orts in earlier
rounds, and so we should see a negative relationship between the average e®ort a Second Mover
has seen in earlier rounds and her e®ort in the current round. We ¯nd no evidence of such a
relationship.34
Equity. As we explain in Section 3.2, if the Second Movers disliked inequity in monetary
payo®s their marginal incentives to exert e®ort would continue to be independent of First Mover
e®ort, so such inequity aversion would not lead to a discouragement e®ect as Proposition 1
would continue to apply. A notion of equity in which agents like to align e®orts as inputs and
monetary payo®s as outputs might provide part of the psychological basis for why our subjects
are disappointment averse (see Gill and Stone, 2010, for details) and so exhibit a discourage-
ment e®ect (as noted in footnote 23, our empirical results provide no direct evidence about the
psychological processes which might underlie disappointment aversion in our experiment).
34Speci¯cally, for every round r > 1, and for every Second Mover n, we calculate the average First Mover e®ort
that the Second Mover has seen up to (but not including) that round, where previous e®orts have been partialed
to remove prize and round e®ects. As required by our strategy to identify reciprocity, in our sample we ¯nd
substantial variation in these averages. We then estimate the reduced form model (11) with this average as an
extra term. The estimated coe±cient on this new term is not statistically signi¯cantly di®erent from zero (p value
of 0.782).
256 Conclusion
People compete all the time, e.g., for: promotions; bonuses; professional partnerships; elected
positions; social status; and sporting trophies. In these situations the competitors exert e®ort to
improve their prospects of success, and clear winners and losers emerge. Our results indicate that
winners are elated while losers are disappointed, and that disappointment is the stronger emo-
tion. In particular, we show that when our experimental subjects compete in a sequential-move
real e®ort competition, they are loss averse around an endogenous expectations-based reference
point which is conditioned on their own work e®ort and that of their rival. Disappointment
aversion creates a discouragement e®ect, whereby a competitor slacks o® when her rival works
hard. Our results speak to the debate about the speed at which reference points adjust. K} oszegi
and Rabin (2007) note that it is unclear how much time is needed between agents making their
choices and the outcome occurring for the reference point to become choice-acclimating. Given
the tiny temporal gap between the agents' e®ort choices and the outcome of the tournament, our
results indicate that, at least in our competitive framework, the adjustment process is essentially
instantaneous.
We hope that our theoretical model and empirical ¯ndings will provide a useful building
block when predicting how people will behave in competitive situations. Furthermore, the
¯ndings may be helpful to principals when designing competitive environments. For example,
employers will want to know how much they need to compensate employees for the expected
disappointment implicit in di®erent types of compensation schemes. They will also be interested
in the degree to which a given compensation structure might impact on employees' work e®orts,




A.1 Proof of Proposition 2
Using (1) and (7),
EU2(e2;e1) = v
µ









We use a proof by contradiction. Suppose that when e1 increases from e11 to e12 > e11, the
Second Mover's optimal e®ort e¤
2 increases from e¤
21 to e¤
22 > e¤
21. By the optimality of the
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22)(e12 ¡ e11) < 0 (21)
given ¸2 > 0 for a disappointment averse Second Mover, which contradicts (18) ¸ 0 from above.
Note that if there are multiple optima, the proof extends naturally to show that the highest
optimal e®ort in response to e12 must lie weakly below the lowest in response to e11.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 3














2°2 ¡ c: (23)
We assume that 2°2c ¡ ¸2v > 0, so the objective function is strictly concave.






















Given ¸2 > 0 and 2°2c ¡ ¸2v > 0, in the interior
de¤
2
de1 is clearly strictly negative and strictly
decreasing in ¸2 and v.
Suppose second that the action space A is discrete. Take any e2 2 A for which there exists
a higher e®ort which is a best response to some e1 2 [0;e] and a lower e®ort with the same
property. Let e+
2 be the next highest e®ort in A and let e¡
2 be the next lowest e®ort in A. Using
(9) and (17), EU2(e+
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27The cut-o® e1 at which EU2(e+















Given ¸2 > 0 and 2°2c ¡ ¸2v > 0 by assumption, the cut-o®s are strictly decreasing in the
Second Mover's e®ort. From Proposition 2, best responses are (weakly) falling in e1. Thus if e1
was continuous but e2 was discrete, the cut-o®s would represent the points at which the Second
Mover's reaction function jumped down. As both are discrete, the cut-o®s de¯ne the Second
Mover's reaction function in the interior: e2 is a best response for the Second Mover for and
only for any e1 2 [¸ e1(e+
2 ;e2); ¸ e1(e2;e¡
2 )] \ A. The range [¸ e1(e+
2 ;e2); ¸ e1(e2;e¡
2 )] is of size
¸ e1(e2;e¡












which is strictly decreasing in ¸2 and v.
That the cut-o®s are strictly decreasing in e2 is the discrete case analogue of the reaction
function being strictly downward sloping in the continuous case. That the size of the ranges
between the cut-o®s is strictly decreasing in ¸2 and v is the discrete case analogue of the reaction
function becoming strictly steeper in ¸2 and v in the continuous case. Note also the functional
form similarity: supposing that the permitted e2's increase in unit steps,
e+
2 +e2
2 = e2 + 1
2, so the
rate of change of ¸ e1(e+
2 ;e2) with respect to e2 is the inverse of the slope of the reaction function
in the continuous case.
B MSM: Further Details
B.1 Construction of Simulated Samples
The construction of each simulated sample is conditional on the First Mover e®orts and prizes
observed in the actual sample. Additionally we make random draws which will later be used to
construct the unobservables appearing in the structural model. Speci¯cally, for each simulated
sample s = 1;:::;S we construct matrices of dimensions N £1, N £1 and N £10, denoted Q1s,
Q2s and Q3s respectively. Each element of Q1s, Q2s and Q3s contains a random draw from
a standard uniform distribution. These matrices are held ¯xed throughout the estimation.35
Given a trial parameter vector µt, the e®ort choice of the nth Second Mover in the rth round of
the sth sample is determined as follows:
1. The Second Mover is assigned values of the unobservables ¸2;n, ¹n and ¼n;r in accor-
dance with the distributional assumptions made in Section 4.3.1. Draws from the normal
distribution are found by transforming Q1s as follows:
¸2;n = e ¸2 + ¾¸©¡1(Q1s;n); (29)
35Thus as the trial parameter vector µt is adjusted the simulated samples vary only due to the change in µt and
not due to variation in the underlying random draws. This is necessary to ensure convergence of the estimation
routine (Stern, 1997).
28where ©¡1 denotes the inverse of the standard normal distribution function. Draws from
the Weibull distribution are obtained by transforming Q2s and Q3s as follows:
¹n = Á¹(¡ln(Q2s;n))1='¹; (30)
¼n;r = Á¼(¡ln(Q3s;n;r))1='¼: (31)
The values of the parameters e ¸2, ¾¸, '¹, '¼, Á¹ and Á¼ are obtained by extracting the
relevant elements of µt.
2. Given the assigned values of ¸2;n, ¹n and ¼n;r and the remaining parameters of the cost of
e®ort function, b, · and ±r for r = 2;:::;10 as given by µt, the expected utility associated
with each feasible Second Mover e®ort is computed using (7), (9) and (13).
3. The Second Mover is assigned the e®ort choice corresponding to the highest expected
utility.
Steps 1-3 are repeated for each of the 10 rounds, the N Second Movers and the S simulated sam-
ples. Note that by comparing the expected utilities associated with each of the 49 feasible e®ort
choices we fully account for the discreteness of e®ort. Additionally, the method of simulation
does not rely on the objective function being well behaved.
B.2 Asymptotic Properties and Numerical Methods
Under the conditions in Pakes and Pollard (1989), b µ is consistent and asymptotically normal.
Speci¯cally, with S ¯xed,
p
N(b µ ¡ µ)












as N ! 1; (32)
where ­ = Ncov(M) is the covariance matrix of the sample moments normalized by the sample














When implementing MSM, we use S = 30 simulated samples and therefore simulate 17700
pairings when using N = 59, and we estimate the weight matrix WN using 2000 bootstrapped





Ms(µt) appearing in J(µt) in (14) is not a continuous function of the parameter
vector µt as small changes in µt may cause discrete changes in some Second Movers' optimal
e®ort choices. Consequently gradient and Hessian based optimization methods are unsuitable
for minimizing J(µt). Instead we use Simulated Annealing in the form suggested by Go®e et al.
(1994) to solve for the MSM estimates.







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































30Observed Bootstrapped Fitted z Test for
Moment SD Moment Di®erence
SD(e2;n;r) 5.875 0.497 5.496 -0.760
Corr(e2;n;r;e2;n;r¡1) 0.652 0.062 0.633 -0.307
Corr(e2;n;r;e2;n;r¡2) 0.596 0.085 0.603 0.087
SD(e2;n;r ¡ e2;n;r¡1) 4.828 0.719 4.645 -0.255
Mean(e2;n;1) 21.763 0.784 21.602 -0.205
Mean(e2;n;2) 23.458 0.633 23.264 -0.305
Mean(e2;n;3) 24.831 0.650 24.933 0.158
Mean(e2;n;4) 25.203 0.585 25.360 0.268
Mean(e2;n;5) 25.119 0.737 24.927 -0.260
Mean(e2;n;6) 24.898 0.897 25.233 0.373
Mean(e2;n;7) 25.763 0.798 25.968 0.258
Mean(e2;n;8) 26.169 0.673 26.310 0.208
Mean(e2;n;9) 26.254 0.860 26.401 0.171
Mean(e2;n;10) 26.729 0.774 26.592 -0.177
Corr(e2;n;r;vn;r j e1;n;r;e1;n;rvn;r;RD;FE) 0.124 0.044 0.084 -0.905
Corr(e2;n;r;e1;n;r j vn;r;e1;n;rvn;r;RD;FE) 0.041 0.042 0.003 -0.916
Corr(e2;n;r;vn;re1;n;r j e1;n;r;vn;r;RD;FE) -0.095 0.047 -0.038 1.200
Pc17Corrn(e2;n;r;vn;rje1;n;r;e1;n;rvn;r;RT) -0.275 0.098 -0.179 0.975
Pc33Corrn(e2;n;r;vn;rje1;n;r;e1;n;rvn;r;RT) 0.033 0.079 0.043 0.124
Pc50Corrn(e2;n;r;vn;rje1;n;r;e1;n;rvn;r;RT) 0.222 0.071 0.212 -0.145
Pc66Corrn(e2;n;r;vn;rje1;n;r;e1;n;rvn;r;RT) 0.388 0.041 0.360 -0.675
Pc83Corrn(e2;n;r;vn;rje1;n;r;e1;n;rvn;r;RT) 0.469 0.051 0.523 1.051
Pc17Corrn(e2;n;r;e1;n;rjvn;r;e1;n;rvn;r;RT) -0.328 0.052 -0.386 -1.118
Pc33Corrn(e2;n;r;e1;n;rjvn;r;e1;n;rvn;r;RT) -0.218 0.061 -0.204 0.224
Pc50Corrn(e2;n;r;e1;n;rjvn;r;e1;n;rvn;r;RT) 0.019 0.089 -0.027 -0.514
Pc66Corrn(e2;n;r;e1;n;rjvn;r;e1;n;rvn;r;RT) 0.179 0.064 0.141 -0.585
Pc83Corrn(e2;n;r;e1;n;rjvn;r;e1;n;rvn;r;RT) 0.361 0.064 0.350 -0.169
Pc17Corrn(e2;n;r;vn;re1;n;rje1;n;r;vn;r;RT) -0.194 0.080 -0.208 -0.175
Pc33Corrn(e2;n;r;vn;re1;n;rje1;n;r;vn;r;RT) 0.019 0.067 0.001 -0.268
Pc50Corrn(e2;n;r;vn;re1;n;rje1;n;r;vn;r;RT) 0.146 0.057 0.169 0.395
Pc66Corrn(e2;n;r;vn;re1;n;rje1;n;r;vn;r;RT) 0.298 0.068 0.305 0.101
Pc83Corrn(e2;n;r;vn;re1;n;rje1;n;r;vn;r;RT) 0.474 0.050 0.483 0.170
Mean(e2;n;rje1;n;r<23\vn;r<1:33) 23.821 0.867 24.121 0.346
Mean(e2;n;rje1;n;r<23\vn;r>2:55) 25.485 0.814 25.595 0.135
Mean(e2;n;rje1;n;r>28\vn;r<1:33) 25.836 0.975 25.265 -0.586
Mean(e2;n;rje1;n;r>28\vn;r>2:55) 25.050 1.208 25.665 0.509
Prop(e2;n;r < 15) 0.029 0.010 0.033 0.401
Prop(e2;n;r > 35) 0.015 0.008 0.017 0.206
Notes: See Table 4 for a description of the moments. Observed moments are computed
from the sample and ¯tted moments are computed using parameter estimates from the
preferred speci¯cation.
Table 5: Goodness of ¯t of the preferred speci¯cation.
31C Experimental Instructions [Intended for online publication]
Please open the brown envelope you have just collected. I am reading from the four page
instructions sheet which you will ¯nd in your brown envelope. [Open brown envelope]
Thank you for participating in this session. There will be a number of pauses for you to ask
questions. During such a pause, please raise your hand if you want to ask a question. Apart
from asking questions in this way, you must not communicate with anybody in this room. Please
now turn o® mobile phones and any other electronic devices. These must remain turned o® for
the duration of this session. Are there any questions?
You have been allocated to a computer booth according to the number on the card you
selected as you came in. You must not look into any of the other computer booths at any time
during this session. As you came in you also selected a white sealed envelope. Please now open
your white envelope. [Open white envelope]
Each white envelope contains a di®erent four digit Participant ID number. To ensure
anonymity, your actions in this session are linked to this Participant ID number and at the
end of this session you will be paid by Participant ID number. You will be paid a show up fee
of $4 together with any money you accumulate during this session. The amount of money you
accumulate will depend partly on your actions, partly on the actions of others and partly on
chance. All payments will be made in cash in another room. Neither I nor any of the other
participants will see how much you have been paid. Please follow the instructions that will
appear shortly on your computer screen to enter your four digit Participant ID number. [Enter
four digit Participant ID number] Please now return your Participant ID number to its
envelope, and keep this safe as your Participant ID number will be required for payment at the
end.
This session consists of 2 practice rounds, for which you will not be paid, followed by 10
paying rounds with money prizes. In each round you will undertake an identical task lasting
120 seconds. The task will consist of a screen with 48 sliders. Each slider is initially positioned
at 0 and can be moved as far as 100. Each slider has a number to its right showing its current
position. You can use the mouse in any way you like to move each slider. You can readjust
the position of each slider as many times as you wish. Your \points score" in the task will be
the number of sliders positioned at exactly 50 at the end of the 120 seconds. Are there any
questions?
Before the ¯rst practice round, you will discover whether you are a \First Mover" or a
\Second Mover". You will remain either a First Mover or a Second Mover for the entirety of
this session.
In each round, you will be paired. One pair member will be a First Mover and the other
will be a Second Mover. The First Mover will undertake the task ¯rst, and then the Second
Mover will undertake the task. The Second Mover will see the First Mover's points score before
starting the task.
In each paying round, there will be a prize which one pair member will win. Each pair's
prize will be chosen randomly at the beginning of the round and will be between $0.10 and
$3.90. The winner of the prize will depend on the di®erence between the First Mover's and the
Second Mover's points scores and some element of chance. If the points scores are the same,
32each pair member will have a 50% chance of winning the prize. If the points scores are not the
same, the chance of winning for the pair member with the higher points score increases by 1
percentage point for every increase of 1 in the di®erence between the points scores, while the
chance of winning for the pair member with the lower points score correspondingly decreases
by 1 percentage point. The table at the end of these instructions gives the chance of winning
for any points score di®erence. Please look at this table now. [Look at table] Are there any
questions?
During each task, a number of pieces of information will appear at the top of your screen,
including the time remaining, the round number, whether you are a First Mover or a Second
Mover, the prize for the round and your points score in the task so far. If you are a Second
Mover, you will also see the points score of the First Mover you are paired with.
After both pair members have completed the task, each pair member will see a summary
screen showing their own points score, the other pair member's points score, their probability
of winning, the prize for the round and whether they were the winner or the loser of the round.
We will now start the ¯rst of the two practice rounds. In the practice rounds, you will be
paired with an automaton who behaves randomly. Before we start, are there any questions?
Please look at your screen now. [First practice round] Before we start the second practice
round, are there any questions? Please look at your screen now. [Second practice round]
Are there any questions?
The practice rounds are ¯nished. We will now move on to the 10 paying rounds. In every
paying round, each First Mover will be paired with a Second Mover. The pairings will be changed
after every round and pairings will not depend on your previous actions. You will not be paired
with the same person twice. Furthermore, the pairings are done in such a way that the actions
you take in one round cannot a®ect the actions of the people you will be paired with in later
rounds. This also means that the actions of the person you are paired with in a given round
cannot be a®ected by your actions in earlier rounds. (If you are interested, this is because you
will not be paired with a person who was paired with someone who had been paired with you,
and you will not be paired with a person who was paired with someone who had been paired
with someone who had been paired with you, and so on.) Are there any questions?
We will now start the 10 paying rounds. There will be no pauses between the rounds.
Before we start the paying rounds, are there any remaining questions? There will be no further
opportunities to ask questions. Please look at your screen now. [10 paying rounds]
The session is now complete. Your total cash payment, including the show up fee, is displayed
on your screen. Please leave the room one by one when asked to do so to receive your payment.
Remember to bring the envelope containing your four digit Participant ID number with you but
please leave all other materials on your desk. Thank you for participating.
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49 Not possible as there are only 48 sliders
50 Not possible as there are only 48 sliders
Table 6: Chance of winning in a given round.
34D Comprehension Quiz [Intended for online publication]
[The subsection on \Confusion" in Section 5 describes the subject pool and reports summary
statistics on the results of the quiz.]
Please look at the ¯rst page of the instructions on your desk. I am reading from these
instructions. Please now turn o® cell phones and any other electronic devices. These must
remain turned o® for the duration of this session. Please do not use or place on your desk any
personal items, including calculators, phones etc. Please do not look into anyone else's booth
at any time. Thank you for participating in this experimental session on economic decision-
making. You were randomly selected from the Economic Science Laboratory's pool of subjects
to be invited to participate in this session. There will be a number of pauses for you to ask
questions. During such a pause, please raise your hand if you want to ask a question. Apart from
asking questions, you must not communicate with anybody in this room or make any noise. You
will be paid a show-up fee of $5 together with any money you accumulate during this session.
You will be paid privately in cash at the end of the session. Are there any questions? Please
turn to page 2 now.
This session consists of a test of understanding. The situation described below formed part of
a previous experiment, and we want to see whether the subjects in that experiment understood
the situation. Please consider the situation described below carefully, and then answer the 10
questions about the situation on pages 5 and 6. You will earn $2 for every right answer and
you will not be penalized for wrong answers. I will read the situation aloud and then you will
have 20 minutes to answer the 10 questions. Note that you will not be participating directly in
the situation described: all you have to do is answer the 10 questions about it. Are there any
questions?
THE SITUATION:
Two people are randomly paired and then compete to win a prize of $3. The two people
separately complete a task in which they can score from 0 to 48 points. Each person's score in
the task is called their \points score". One person, called the \First Mover", completes the task
¯rst. The other person, called the \Second Mover", then completes the task.
The winner of the prize will depend on the di®erence between the First Mover's and the
Second Mover's points scores and some element of chance. If the points scores are the same,
each pair member will have a 50% chance of winning the prize. If the points scores are not the
same, the chance of winning for the pair member with the higher points score increases by 1
percentage point for every increase of 1 in the di®erence between the points scores, while the
chance of winning for the pair member with the lower points score correspondingly decreases by 1
percentage point. The table on page 3 gives the chance of winning for any points score di®erence.
Please turn to page 3 now and look at this table, and then wait for further instructions.
[The text in the paragraph above is from the original experimental instructions in Appendix C.
The table presented to the subjects in the quiz was the same as Table 6 which was presented to
the original experimental subjects, except that \there are only 48 sliders" was replaced with \the
maximum points score is 48".]
35Please turn to page 4 now. Are there any questions? You will have 20 minutes to answer the
10 questions on pages 5 and 6. If you ¯nish before 20 minutes, please wait in your booth. I will
give you verbal warnings when there are 15 minutes left, when there are 10 minutes left, when
there are 5 minutes left, and when there is 1 minute left. If you have a question during the 20
minutes, please raise your hand. You are allowed to refer back to the description of the situation
on page 2 and the table on page 3 to help you answer the questions. You will earn $2 for every
right answer and you will not be penalized for wrong answers. Are there any questions? Please
turn to page 5 now. Your 20 minutes start now.
[We ran two treatments, each with 30 subjects, which di®ered only in the Second Mover
points score numbers. Below, the numbers in the ¯rst brackets are from the ¯rst treatment and
the numbers in the second brackets are from the second treatment.]
QUESTIONS 1 TO 5 (Please turn to the next page for questions 6 to 10)
You have 20 minutes to answer all 10 questions. You are allowed to refer back to the
description of the situation on page 2 and the table on page 3 to help you answer the questions.
You will earn $2 for every right answer and you will not be penalized for wrong answers.
For questions 1 to 5, suppose that the First Mover's points score is 20.
Q1: If the Second Mover's points score is [33][16], what is the di®erence between the points
scores of the two people? [Correct answer: [13][4]]
Q2: If the Second Mover's points score is [33][16], what is the Second Mover's probability of
winning the prize (that is, how many times out of 100 would the Second Mover win the prize
on average)? [Correct answer: [63%][46%]]
Q3: If the Second Mover's points score is [34][17], what is the di®erence between the points
scores of the two people? [Correct answer: [14][3]]
Q4: If the Second Mover's points score is [34][17], what is the Second Mover's probability of
winning the prize (that is, how many times out of 100 would the Second Mover win the prize
on average)? [Correct answer: [64%][47%]]
Q5: If the Second Mover's points score goes up from [33][16] to [34][17], what is the increase
in the Second Mover's probability of winning the prize (that is, how many more times out of
100 would the Second Mover win the prize on average)? [Correct answer: [1][1]]
QUESTIONS 6 TO 10
You have 20 minutes to answer all 10 questions. You are allowed to refer back to the
description of the situation on page 2 and the table on page 3 to help you answer the questions.
You will earn $2 for every right answer and you will not be penalized for wrong answers.
For questions 6 to 10, suppose that the First Mover's points score is 30.
Q6: If the Second Mover's points score is [33][16], what is the di®erence between the points
scores of the two people? [Correct answer: [3][14]]
Q7: If the Second Mover's points score is [33][16], what is the Second Mover's probability of
winning the prize (that is, how many times out of 100 would the Second Mover win the prize
on average)? [Correct answer: [53%][36%]]
36Q8: If the Second Mover's points score is [34][17], what is the di®erence between the points
scores of the two people? [Correct answer: [4][13]]
Q9: If the Second Mover's points score is [34][17], what is the Second Mover's probability of
winning the prize (that is, how many times out of 100 would the Second Mover win the prize
on average)? [Correct answer: [54%][37%]]
Q10: If the Second Mover's points score goes up from [33][16] to [34][17], what is the increase
in the Second Mover's probability of winning the prize (that is, how many more times out of
100 would the Second Mover win the prize on average)? [Correct answer: [1][1]]
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